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Abstract 
 
This article undertakes an empirical analysis of M&A-related risks based on evidence from eight 
listed U.S. bank holding companies over the period 2000-10. The research model is designed as an 
inter-domain risk matrix encompassing idiosyncratic and systematic risks underlying horizontal and 
conglomerate M&A. Risk impact is measured by critical performance metrics at corporate and 
environmental levels in the pre- and post-M&A periods. It was found insignificant relationship 
between synergy and concentration and marginal priority of financial over operating synergy in the 
post-M&A realm. While systematic risk can be mitigated by horizontal M&A followed by majority 
ownership, its adverse effect is insurmountable for institutions resulted from conglomerate M&A.  
 
JEL classification: D02; E02; G21; G28; G34 
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions (M&A); U.S. banking industry; Idiosyncratic risk; Systematic 
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1. Introduction 
The banking industry critically depends on macroeconomic dynamics and is rigorously regulated. 
To survive in volatile environment and maintain competitive advantage, banks strategize higher 
productivity and efficacy through organic or inorganic, or combination of both, evolution. One of 
the regularly employed elements of inorganic growth is mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which to 
date have demonstrated a proven significance in facilitating growth at a firm-specific level as well 
as in tailoring industry landscape. 
     Despite general positivism, a number of M&A produce inconsistencies and detract or destroy 
value of the resulting (post-M&A) institutions. M&A failures are of serious concern of corporate 
executives, shareholders, and regulators. Macroeconomic tumultuousness further exacerbates risk 
of post-M&A value deficiency thus challenging consolidation movement at large. It is therefore 
obvious that M&A enable, and not secure, banks to amplify their growth capabilities and 
sustainability to systematic risk
1)
. The odds of deteriorating scenarios bring to the forefront the issue 
of risk management at both micro- and macro-levels with the purpose to minimize adverse effect of 
economic uncertainty and turmoil. In fact, criticality of risk management is oftentimes understated 
owing to lopsided focus on primarily micro-level aspects of M&A and excessive prioritization of 
instantaneous post-M&A benefits. Such an approach not only is flawed by predominantly short-run 
quantitative effects but also misses other fundamentals of the M&A process, especially in its 
integration phase. 
     This article is an attempt to narrow down the risk-related gap in the M&A knowledge and 
practice and to systematize important risk factors from risk management heights. It suggests some 
                                                 
1)
 Hereinafter systematic risk is viewed through its two domains – systematic risk at macroeconomic (upper) 
level and systematic risk of the banking industry (lower) level. 
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sensitive aspects that complement the existing risk evaluation criteria and reinvigorates their 
relevance for post-M&A sustainable performance. 
     The research delves into idiosyncratic risk through horizontal M&A while impact of systematic 
risk is assessed by post-M&A ownership and conglomerate consolidations. The empirical analysis 
is based on a panel of 8 listed U.S. bank holding companies over the period 2000-10. They gained a 
remarkable M&A experience in deregulated economy: horizontal and conglomerate, national and 
cross-border. This unique evidence of multidimensionality is a decisive platform for examining 
M&A’s ex post risk factors as well as ex ante effect on macroeconomic environment, stakeholders, 
and society at large. 
     Based on the above premises, this article addresses the following questions: 
 What types of risks underlie M&A processes and what is their probabilistic effect on strategic 
objectives of the resulting banks? 
 
 Whether and to which extent post-M&A concentration attributes to synergetic effect? 
 
 Whether geographic diversification enhances post-M&A resilience to systematic risk? 
 
 Whether and to which extent conglomerate M&A (between bank and non-bank institution) 
affects acquiring bank’s sustainability to systematic risk and how to measure its effect? 
 
 Do M&A mitigate risk of deteriorating performance ensued from environmental uncertainty and 
turmoil? 
 
     The following hypotheses are tested in this article aiming to enlighten aspects put forth in the 
above panel of questions: 
Hypothesis 1. Post-M&A synergy meaninglessly depends on capital market concentration of the 
resulting bank. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Post-M&A diversification withstands systematic risk, if and when a consummated 
M&A deal results in acquiring bank‟s majority ownership in the acquired bank. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Post-M&A integration is exposed to the risk of failure unless it is sustained by 
adequate stock market performance of the resulting bank. 
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Hypothesis 4. Post-M&A conglomerates mitigate endogenous fluctuations and decline in the 
banking industry thus contributing to market equilibrium. 
 
     The research model is designed as a cross-domain risk matrix embedding idiosyncratic and 
systematic risks and horizontal and conglomerate M&A transactions. Risk impact is measured by 
critical performance parameters at micro- and macro-levels in the pre- and post-M&A periods of 
the panel banks. 
     The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 covers literature review 
highlighting theories and empirical findings of the previous investigations in the subject area. 
Section 3 presents research methodology applicable to the innovative methods of M&A risk 
measurement. Section 4 is a place of testing hypotheses based on research methodology followed 
by analysis and discussion of the results. Section 5 summarizes the research outcome and concludes 
on recommendations to banks and regulators, while Section 6 sets scope for further research.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Extant academic literature demonstrates conflicting findings on measuring post-M&A outcome 
while scarcely elucidates how M&A risks could be mitigated. Some core M&A aspects like 
whether operating or financial synergy
2)
 is superior in contributing to post-M&A value creation as 
well as links to regulation and macroeconomic parameters are still missing their holistic analysis 
and understanding. Moreover, findings are short of unbiased and comprehensive realization of other 
environmental factors challenging post-M&A realm. This academic gap coupled with fragmentary 
                                                 
2)
 Post-M&A operating synergy is defined by the accounting-based performance measures and is expressed 
by profitability of the resulting institution that exceeds profitability of each of the pre-M&A institutions 
taken together. Post-M&A financial synergy is defined by market capitalization of the resulting institution 
that exceeds market capitalization of each of the pre-M&A institutions taken together. 
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and episodic research of M&A-driven forces (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999, pp.1, 3) triggers 
indetermination and misconception of risk-originated factors underlying M&A. On the other side, 
dearth of relevant theoretical basics and bases aggravate further synthesis of various academic foci 
in the field (Haleblian et al., 2009) thus refraining their validity for organizational settings and 
industry regulators.  
2.1. Capital Market Concentration and Synergy. 
In recent decades, expeditious development of M&A processes and avalanching post-M&A 
challenges have dramatically changed the landscape of post-M&A concentration, market 
configuration, and competition. Search for logics in measuring relationship between concentration 
and synergy urged Berger and Hannan (1989) to synthesize ‘price–concentration’ relationship. 
They observe that higher concentration engenders inadequate performance behavior resulting in 
mispricing
3)
 and abnormal returns due to poor adjustment of deposit rates in concentrated markets 
followed by completion of the M&A deal. Later on, Berger and Hannan (1998) observe that higher 
concentration instigates corporations to mechanistically exercise maximization of profits and 
shareholder value and again come to conclusion that such a simplified approach elicits cost 
inefficiency, mispricing, and welfare loss and may ultimately ruin strategic intent. Chatterjee (1992) 
further posits that synergy depends on concentration thus multiplying bank’s competitive 
capabilities; he however provides no evidence of attainability of synergy in isolation from 
concentration. Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001) observe that value creation attributes to post-
M&A cost efficiency while Peltzman (1977) states that the latter determines ‘concentration–
profitability’ correlation. Cogman and Tan (2010) conclude that ‘maximization of post-M&A return 
                                                 
3)
 Higher rates of fees and commission (that is, exceeding the average level in a particular market), which is a 
direct consequence of increased market concentration and poorer competition. 
 6 
– minimization of risk of failure’ dilemma urges banks to set a balanced combination of post-M&A 
benefits, including concentration, and costs. 
     Although causal relationship between concentration and profitability is acceptable to risk-
efficient policy, Smirlock (1985) draws an inference that concentration is secondary to market 
capitalization and is associated with competition, while abnormal returns stem from lower costs and 
higher prices are linked to accounting measures only. At the same time, his study is limited by one-
bank corporations and lacks analysis of bank holding companies (BHC). Some other findings also 
gravitate to efficiency, rather than performance-structured, doctrine. Thus, by analyzing linkages 
between concentration and increased competition, Demsetz (1973) suggests that concentration 
derives from corporations’ (and industry’s)  
“…superiority in producing and marketing products or in the superiority of a structure of 
industry in which there are only a few firms” (p.1). 
     Overall, past researches on ‘concentration–synergy’ relationship results in conflicting findings 
and are not less than fragmented by region or industry analyses. To overcome this gap, it is 
attempted to determine sensitivity of this relationship through focused and deeper analysis of 
dependence of synergy on concentration. Their relationship is tested in Hypothesis 1. 
2.2. Ownership, Diversification, and Systematic Risk. 
There are handful academic works on intrinsic value of synergy gain for the M&A parties. Among 
them is Lubatkin’s (1987) who observe shared benefits for shareholders of the acquirer and the 
acquired companies upon M&A deal consummation. Sudarsanam (2003) expands these findings to 
shareholder wealth increment analysis concluding that M&A outcome has a disadvantageous effect 
for acquirer’s shareholders while shareholders of the target company are benefited by abnormal 
returns. According to Houston and Ryngaert (1994), this effect sometimes is attained at the expense 
of the acquiring bank’s owners. Zollo and Singh (2004) and Bogan (2009) summarize the above 
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corroborating that deficient synergy for the acquirer puts at significant risk the M&A results, 
through to deal failure. 
     Despite moderate clarity of the relatedness between synergy and ownership, findings are 
constrained by endogenous factors and idiosyncratic risk domain. Needless to emphasize 
fundamentality of systematic risk in shaping industry developments that recently has evolved to a 
‘master’ element qualifying survivability of most M&A. Besides, gone are the times when U.S. 
banks were expanding within their home states or adjacent territories, which required comparatively 
simpler set of post-M&A performance efficiency metrics. During almost two recent decades, the 
U.S. banking sector has witnessed an exponential variety of cross-industry, cross-border, and cross-
product diversifications, each with unique parameters and strategic rationale. In their impressing 
work, Berger and DeYoung (2001) found that diversification had both positive and diminishing 
effects on post-M&A efficiency, and that the negative effect is escalating along with subsidiaries’ 
increasing distance from their headquarters. Nevertheless, network economies outstrip negative 
effect by benefits from risk transfer. Grabowski, Rangan and Rezvanian (1993), conversely, posit 
that geographic diversification increases post-M&A risk of failure proving it by comparative 
analysis of BHC and branch banking institutions. Their stance on riskier activity mirrors in Demsetz 
and Strahan (1997) who observe the same pertaining to the changed structure of the combined 
assets. Cornett and Tehranian (1992) respond to this discussion by comparative study of intrastate 
and interstate pre- and post-M&A performance applying both accounting and market performance 
appraisals and stating that diversification positively affects profitability. Their conclusion is 
consistent with Rhoades (1993) who found that improved performance was a consequence of 
combined deposit base as well as cost reduction. Mishra et al. (2005) observe that horizontal M&A 
significantly reduce idiosyncratic risk, while risk diversification is a main driving force of 
consolidations. Keeley’s (1990) conclusion summarizes the above findings in that diversification 
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has little exposure on market concentration but provides banks with higher returns. Strengthening 
this kaleidoscope of opinions by Lubatkin’s (1987) stance that shareholders’ gain from 
consolidation is subject to majority ownership, it becomes undoubtedly clear that there still remains 
gap in understanding the relationship between synergy and ownership, on the one side, and 
diversification and systematic risk, on the other side. Realization of this linkage in Hypothesis 2 will 
help comprehend whether diversified M&A coupled with majority post-M&A ownership withstand 
systematic risk. 
2.3. Risks in Post-M&A Value Creation. 
Post-M&A synergy is a tacit primary objective of any consolidation and realization of synergetic 
effect is an indispensable element of sustainable development. However, binary (operating and 
financial) synergism is yet to be rationalized by as to which of its components more realistically 
reflect post-M&A efficacy. In other words, dilemma of superiority of the measuring instruments is 
opened for possible alternate considerations. An array of findings favoring or denying their 
significance still keeps the space vacated for additional, more conclusive arguments. 
     Among the proponents of operating synergy are Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) who 
found stable increase of profits of the resulting banks and observed decrease of total risk due to 
diversification. In contrast, Pilloff (1996) did not find any improvements in profitability. Devos, 
Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy (2009) conclude on insignificant role of financial synergy in 
generating post-M&A total synergy owing to its meager (17%) portion compared to operating 
synergy (p.1181). Besides, Aharony and Swary (1981) and Isimbabi and Tucker (1997) by linking 
both types of synergies validate operating benefits as a factor encouraging investors’ confidence. 
However, Meeks and Meeks (1981) warn on excessive reliance on operating synergy stating that  
„… no inferences for efficiency could be drawn solely from evidence of improved 
profitability after merger‟ (p.335),  
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which is partly consistent with Templeton and Severiens (1992) arguing that market return data  
„… serve as indicators of investor perceptions about BHC conditions and prospects‟ (p.5).  
Further, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) by analyzing operating synergy in conjunction with post-
M&A risks opine that increased credit portfolios, which are associated with expected returns and 
consequently operating synergy, may signify riskier performance. Their observation is consistent 
with Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey’s (1997) findings in that refocus to high risk strategy may 
impair revenues. The above discussion urges to solidify the issue of superiority of either type of 
synergy and to investigate whether inadequate post-M&A stock market performance affects post-
M&A value creation that is a centerpiece of Hypothesis 3. 
2.4. Conglomerate M&A and Systematic Risk. 
Despite the fact that banking industry dynamics is highly vulnerable to systematic risk, this 
phenomenon has received scarce academic attention. Its significance for stakeholders is proved by 
high (20-30%) contribution to corporations’ aggregate return (Chatterjee, Lubatkin and 
Schoenecker, 1992, p.139; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997, p.301), deficiency of which may seriously 
weaken post-M&A integration. Academic discussions in the field are ramified by proponents of 
related M&A (Palepu, 1985; Hoskisson et al., 1993) as the only platform for ‘M&A-making’ in the 
banking industry that can sustain systematic risk, and unrelated consolidations with their resilience 
to macroeconomic uncertainties (Chatterjee, 1986; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1988). Among other 
scholars doubting the capability of conglomerate corporations to minimize detrimental effect of 
systematic risk are Templeton and Severiens (1992) and Demsetz and Strahan (1997). 
     In Section 2.2, the discussion was centered on interrelatedness between systematic risk and 
horizontal M&A. Regulatory liberalization in the late 1990s raises criticality of conglomerate M&A 
for steady development of the financial sector. Supported by evidence from the unrelated M&A 
wave in the U.S. banking industry in the first decade of 21st century, recent investigations into 
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conglomerates capture more plausible results. Thus, Bösecke (2009) believes that unrelated M&A 
decrease systematic risk due to less erratic profit fluctuations and incongruous revenue cycles that 
are front line factors securing continuous liquidity, cost-efficiency, and competitiveness. In 
development of these findings, Ng (2007) further concludes that acquirers with heterogeneous 
resource base receive comparatively higher synergy than their peers from horizontal M&A. 
Bajtelsmit and Ligon (1996) opine that banks’ penetration to insurance sector reduces shareholders’ 
risk through economies of scope. While some academic studies hesitate effective exposure to non-
bank activities (Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993), Brewer’s (1989) conclusions are further 
strengthened by specific methodology linking risk measurement to market-based, not to accounting-
based, indicators. Obi and Emenogu (2003) observe reduction of total risk and enhanced 
performance followed by conglomerate M&A while Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) complement 
positive ‘conglomerate M&A – risk reduction’ linkage by evidence from 13 conglomerate deals, 
which manifested post-M&A returns 2.7 times higher of non-conglomerate M&A deals of S&P500 
companies from 1965-83.  
     At the same time, many experts associate the most recent recession with financial liberalization 
originated from Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
4)
 (GLBA) that legitimated M&A between banks and non-
bank financial institutions. Their concern was ultimately materialized in some provisions of Dodd-
Frank Act
5)
 (DFA) that has imposed certain restrictions on banks’ M&A resulting in conglomerates. 
However, strategizing synergies generated from different industries seems to remain a strong 
platform in effective immobilization of macroeconomic risks; in other words, conglomerates 
mitigate adverse effect of systematic risk through inter-industry diversification and enhanced 
capability of resource redeployment that is consistent with Amihud and Lev (1981). Besides, 
                                                 
4)
 Also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. 
5)
 Also known as the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. 
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emergence of conglomerates are dictated by increasingly challenging and rapidly changing 
environmental scenarios and trends in the global finances, and regulatory limitations on inorganic 
growth may diminish the non-diversified resource base of the U.S. banks compared to their 
overseas peers, discourage M&A continuum in the U.S. banking industry and ultimately aggravate 
competitiveness of U.S. credit institutions. That is why Hypothesis 4 is a place to test the extent to 
which conglomerate M&A sustain systematic risk and whether their regulatory supervision requires 
further improvements. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
The research was conducted on evidence from eight listed U.S. bank holding companies
6)
 each with 
equity/assets exceeding $100 billion and customer deposit base covering almost 80% of the national 
banking industry. They have evolved to industry leaders through multiple sophisticated M&A, and 
inorganic expansion is believed to be a solid contributor to their sound performance and 
shareholders’ wealth increment. Statistical data were obtained from annual reports and financial 
statements of the panel banks as well as from EDGAR, COMPUSTAT, and statistical periodicals 
and publications of U.S. regulators. Analysis is based on statistical observations of the M&A 
transactions encompassing three years prior to the M&A event and three years afterwards (3+3 
research horizon) within 2000-10 with only a few exceptions when the deal was commenced before 
2003 or consummated after 2007. Macroeconomic data for measuring systematic risk are sourced 
from the websites of U.S. regulators and Dow Jones & Company and is comprised of combination 
of descriptive and inductive statistics. The research embeds multivariate analysis of core M&A 
determinants. Statistical inference is based on testing hypotheses 1 through 4. Description of 
                                                 
6)
 Bank of America Corporation, Citigroup Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo & Co., PNC 
Financial Services Group, Inc., U.S. Bancorp, SunTrust Banks, Inc., Fifth Third Bancorp. 
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hypotheses variables is presented in Table 1. All data related to statistical observations are 
parametric and are based on Bayesian theory of hypotheses probability (logics of the applied 
objectivist principles) and have continuous normal distribution. 
place Table 1 about here 
3.1. Statistical Instrumentation for Testing Hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 testing applies Spearman rank correlation coefficient computed as a non-parametric 
statistical dependence between capital market concentration variable (CAPCON) represented by 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
7)
 and synergy variables represented by two subpopulation 
variables: operating synergy (OPERSYNER) represented by return on assets (ROA) and financial 
synergy (FINSYNER) represented by market capitalization of the sample banks. It is expected to 
reveal no evidence against null Hypothesis 1 assuming that the acquired resources can be allocated 
within the bank’s network to maximize total synergy and that the increase or decrease of post-M&A 
concentration does not affect performance of the resulting bank. Correlations are computed for 
OPERSYNER/CAPCON and FINSYNER/CAPCON pairs of variables for each of the observed 14 
M&A deals of the sample banks.  
     For research objectivity, observations of variables are randomly distributed among U.S. regions 
in a manner that the distribution would include wider range of indices of capital market 
concentrations (from ‘overbanked’ states such as California, Illinois, New York to comparatively 
‘underbanked’ states like Colorado and Montana). Further, to understand resulting effect of 
concentration on synergy, relationships between pairs of variables are analyzed in both pre- and 
post-M&A periods. Normal CAPCON (Yi1) is associated with official HHI published annually; 
however, to delve into behavioral aspect of the relationships between variables and to reduce 
                                                 
7)
 HHI is an official measuring instrument of capital market concentration as stipulated by Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines. It is a sum of squares of deposit shares of each bank operating in a particular state. 
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observational errors stem from concentration sampling error, frequency of HHI was increased from 
annual to quarterly basis through linear interpolation of CAPCON
8)
 (Yi2). As such, Spearman‟s 
normal (N) and interpolated (I) rank correlation coefficients (ρi(N;I)) are applied to each M&A 
observation specified by OPERSYNER (Xi1) and FINSYNER (Xi2) covering the entire (pre- and post-
M&A) research horizon (Xi1H and Xi2H in case the acquiring bank was presented in the local market 
prior to the M&A event), and post-M&A period (Xi1P and Xi2P) for the remainder M&A deals: 
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where R is rank of the engaged variables, according to Spearman’s rank distribution criteria, as of 
particular date in the observed M&A period; n is number of calendar quarters in the observed M&A 
period. 
     Based on criteria of credibility of intervals of high and low correlations, coefficient’s intervals 
    1;75.075.0;1);( INi  signify high correlation while interval  75.0;75.0);( INi  
denotes low correlation. Computed correlations as per variables, specified research horizons, and 
normal and interpolated statistical distributions for each M&A event of the panel banks are 
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 Interpolated HHI for a specific calendar quarter is a product of HHI between two nearest years according 
to formula: 
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, where X0 and X1 are HHI as of 30th June of the two nearest years, n is 
a number of the observed sub-periods (quarters) within the period to which X0 and X1 belong to. 
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presented in Table 2 and further grouped in Table 3 according to homogeneity of variances of each 
type of correlation. 
     In Hypothesis 2, testing applies continuous normal distribution of stock market indicators 
variable (USPRI) as a measure of systematic risk and a series of accounting indicators variables 
(OWNER_ROA, OWNER_CFEA, OWNER_ER, and OWNER_CLR) as a measure of firm-specific 
risk followed by Student‟s t-test for statistical significance. In 2000-09, 143 out of 177 (or 80.8%) 
M&A deals of the panel banks were categorized as geographically diversified. Since all of them 
were consummated with majority ownership, statistical inference of testing should be treated with 
some caution due to infeasibility of causal effect of minority (that is, less than 50%) ownership. 
Observations of firm-specific variables are further complemented by observations of analogous 
variables of the U.S. peer banks with compatible asset size that is, exceeding $10 billion. Relevant 
statistical population of variables of the banks that fit to the remaining size categories (less than $10 
billion) are not included into this model due to estimated distortion of the research results stem from 
incompatibility of economies of scope and scale. All data are distributed within both entire research 
period and recession sub-period for each subpopulation of variables according to sampling. 
     Based on mean indicators of each variable of the sample and peer banks for the relevant research 
horizons, it is found volatility of the variables, which when compared between sampling groups 
trigger evidence of the degree of their vulnerability to systematic risk from the heights of post-
M&A ownership. Mean volatility ( );( RHiV ) shows sample banks’ degree of sustainability to 
systematic risk based on combine measurement of the involved populations of variables.  

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M
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V      (2) 
where STDi(H;R) is standard deviation of mean indicators for each of the above variables for the 
entire research horizon and recession sub-period; Mi(H;R) is arithmetic mean of mean indicators for 
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each variable for the research period as above, H and R denote entire research horizon and recession 
sub-period respectively. Formula (2) is further transformed to demonstrate inclusion of specified 
variables of the two sampling groups: 
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where S and B denote sample banks and peer banks; n is number of observations. Importance of 
mean volatility is in its aggregated single indication of variables’ volatilities that is comparable with 
identically single volatility of the stock market indicators variable. 
     This hypothesis is further tested for statistical significance by Student‟s t-test for the entire 
research period and recession sub-period. Stem from inequality of statistical population of the 
sample banks and U.S. peer banks t-test (ti(H;R)) is specified for unequal sample sizes with equal 
variances: 
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where 
Mi is mean of each observed variable of the sample as well as peer banks for both the entire 
research horizon and the recession sub-period; 
STDi(S) is standard deviation of the sample banks (n1) pertaining to each variable computed for the 
research horizons as above; and 
STDi(B) is standard deviation of the U.S. peer banks (n2) pertaining to each variable computed for 
the research horizons as above. 
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     Denominator (n1+n2–2) applies to degrees of freedom (DF) of different sample sizes
9)
 in testing 
statistical significance. Although chosen arbitrarily, a statistical significance level is: α=0.05. P-
value is computed for each variable for the entire research horizon and recession sub-period aiming 
to find the extent to which M&A consummated with majority ownership of the acquiring bank 
withstand systematic risk. Computed indicators of volatilities and t-test are presented in Table 4. 
     Hypothesis 3 pinpoints conflicting academic findings as to whether stock market performance is 
a superior measuring instrument of post-M&A consistency. For this purpose, testing involves 
discrete statistical distribution of market capitalization and revenue of the sample banks stratified by 
pre-M&A research period (PREREV and PRECAP) and post-M&A period (POSTREV and 
POSTCAP). To ensure research compatibility, this model employs the same M&A patterns as in 
Hypothesis 1. The following formula applies for measuring volatility of each of the above 
population of variables by using continuous statistical distribution according to 3+3 research 
horizon approach: 
%100
)(
);(
);(
2;1
21
21

PPi
PPi
PPi
M
STD
V       (5) 
where STDi(P1;P2) is standard deviation of revenue and market capitalization of the sample banks in 
the pre-M&A period (P1) and the post-M&A period (P2); Mi is arithmetic mean of each variable 
pertaining to the observed M&A patterns. Formula (5) is further transformed to demonstrate 
inclusion of variables: 
                                                 
9)
 In this case, DF=121 (8+115–2). In the available FDIC resources, the number of the peer banks (with 
assets greater than $10 billion) varies from 110 to 120 over the period 2007-2010. As such, n2 = 115 as an 
arithmetic mean of the above dispersion. 
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where n is number of observations of a particular variable in the relevant research horizon. 
     Volatilities of variables pertaining to each M&A transaction are grouped in Table 5. Student‟s t-
distribution (Table 6) applies equal statistical populations of the sample banks (that is, equal sample 
sizes with equal variances): 
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where 
Mi is mean of each of the observed variables of the sample banks in the pre-M&A period (either 
PREREV or PRECAP) and post-M&A period (either POSTREV or POSTCAP) (mean indicators of 
variables of more than one M&A event are averaged to an aggregated mean); 
STD(PREREV;PRECAP) is standard deviation of homogeneous variables for the pre-M&A period; and 
STD(POSTREV;POSTCAP) is standard deviation of homogeneous variables for the post-M&A period. 
 
     DF equals to 14
10)
. P-value is computed for each pair of homogeneous population of variables to 
reveal which of the variables more realistically measure post-M&A performance consistency. 
     Although volatility of operating and financial variables at different stages of the M&A process 
explicitly demonstrates the degree of their significance in measuring post-M&A integrity, it would 
be judicious to complement this model by identification of superior measure in relation to CAPCON 
                                                 
10)
 2n–2 where n=8. 
 18 
by linking mean correlation coefficients of each pair of variables (OPERSYNER/CAPCON and 
FINSYNER/CAPCON) within the specified variances pertaining to the correlation interval, which 
shows the highest frequency of occurrences (see Table 3). The following formula applies: 
%100
);( 21 
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YYi
i
M
STD
V ii      (8) 
where STDi(Yi1;Yi2) is standard deviation of normal and interpolated correlation coefficients as per 
Table 3 for the entire (H) and post-M&A (P) research horizons for OPERSYNER/CAPCON and 
FINSYNER/CAPCON for the each observed M&A deal; Mi is arithmetic mean of correlation 
coefficients pertaining to each pair of variables for the research horizons as above. Based on basics of 
formula (6), formula (8) is further transformed to include rank correlation coefficients (ρi) for both 
pairs of variables for normal and interpolated distributions for the research horizons as above: 
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where n is number of observations of each pair of variables for each M&A pattern. 
     In Hypothesis 4, testing is based on comparative analysis of variables of the acquiring bank 
(NONROA, NONCAP, and NONPRI) and their aggregated equivalents at macroeconomic level. 
Specifically, variables of the upper level systematic risk are distributed by market capitalization of 
the 25 peer banks, which have assets/equity exceeding $10 billion (USCAP) and by stock market 
indices represented by S&P500 SMI (USPRI); variables of the lower level systematic risk are 
represented by ROA of the above peer group (USROA_L), of the group of the large U.S. banks with 
foreign offices (USROA_F), and of all U.S. scheduled commercial banks (USROA). Following post-
M&A continuous normal distribution of variables, their volatilities applicable to each conglomerate 
M&A occurrence are found based on the following formula:  
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where N and U denote variables at micro- and macro- (both upper and lower macroeconomic 
segments) levels respectively; ROA is a universal abbreviation for NONROA, USROA_L, 
USROA_F, and USROA; CAP is a universal abbreviation for NONCAP and USCAP; PRI is a 
universal abbreviation for NONPRI and USPRI; n is number of observations of each pair of 
variables in the post-M&A research horizon. Found volatilities are summarized in Table 7, based on 
which it is concluded on the degree of volatility of conglomerate M&A to systematic risk. 
     Since testing involves unequal sample sizes with equal variances, t-test is based on formula (4) 
for each pairs of homogeneous variables (NONROA/USROA, NONCAP/USCAP, and 
NONPRI/USPRI) for the observed period. However, to minimize observational error, DF of each 
group of variables for each sample bank differ depending on sample sizes implying that 
DF(NONROA/USROA_L) = 115
11)
, DF(NONCAP/USCAP) = 25
12)
, and DF(NONPRI/USPRI) = 500
13)
: 
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3.2. Limitations of the Research. 
The research results are affected as per Berger et al.’s (2004) findings that synergies differ in short- 
and long-run depending on actual materialization of the increased market power of the resulting 
institution. Although the research horizon of M&A activity of the U.S. banks covers a period of ten 
                                                 
11)
 Is an arithmetic result of 2+115–2. 
12)
 Is an arithmetic result of 2+25–2. 
13)
 Is an arithmetic result of 2+500–2. 
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years, equally important are the latest specifics of environmental dynamics, which are tailoring the 
contemporary factors, facets, manageability of the M&A transactions, and sustainability of post-
M&A institutions. This vigor is increasingly challenging traditional but still shortsighted foci on 
tangible post-M&A benefits omitting implicit but determinative factors that immensely contribute 
to successful M&A realization. Macroeconomic uncertainty and multiplying variety of elements 
underlying systematic risk urge risk managerism to become a priority in conducting the M&A 
processes. This is a focal point of M&A paradigm shift, which will be discussed in details in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
     Another aspect of research limitations relates to biases of statistical inference. It is unfeasible to 
quantify synergetic effect as incurred costs are a matter of managerial accounting and therefore are 
not available for public use. At the same time, all the analyzed M&A deals of the sample banks are 
considered as having been accomplished, according to the official sites of U.S. regulators where 
there was no any information or statement regarding abandoned deals or unfavorable post-M&A 
outcome. It is therefore strongly believed that the examined M&A deals have been consummated 
with synergetic gain and thus testing hypotheses reflects plausible results. 
     Turbulent macroeconomic environment has significantly affected the U.S. banking industry to 
the detriment of market capitalization of the credit institutions. However, it is impossible to 
determine whether worsened post-M&A stock market performance of the panel banks was affected 
by tightened industry regulation. In this case, compartmentalization of systematic risk into upper 
and lower levels would provide more evidence on causal effect of environmental conditions on 
critical indicators of post-M&A performance and would further comprehend underlying risk 
factors. Such an approach would also facilitate modeling of hypothetical M&A between 
banking/financial and non-financial industries (this type of consolidation is nowadays legally 
banned) to understand whether and the extent to which the restrictive provisions of Glass-Steagall 
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Act
14)
 could be modified so that to expand economically-driven principles of organizational growth 
and to elevate competitive advantage of the U.S. banks to a more sustainable level during economic 
meltdowns. 
 
4. Empirical Findings and Analysis / Discussion of Results 
Hypothesis 1 testing is based on 14 horizontal M&A occurrences over the period 2001-07. 
place Table 2 about here 
     Analysis of correlations for OPERSYNER/CAPCON and FINSYNER/CAPCON revealed 
weakening effect of each of the synergy variables on concentration after the M&A event as well as 
their predominantly weak relationship between both pairs of variables at large (Table 3). 
place Table 3 about here 
     High correlation is shown by marginal number of variances of both pairs of variables. This echo 
with Berger and Hannan (1998) and Rhoades (1982) observing no evidence of relationship between 
concentration and post-M&A value creation. Furthermore, increase of concentration may trigger 
diminishing effect for synergy, even if the acquiring bank was ‘resident’ of the local market prior to 
consolidation. This is illustrated by high correlation in case of increased concentration 
(Citibank/Citibank West; SunTrust Bank/Lighthouse Community Bank; PNC Bank/United Trust 
Bank; and Fifth Third Bank/Capital Bank mergers) as well as decreased concentration (J.P. 
MorganChase/Bank One and U.S. Bank/Weststar Bank mergers), which is evidence of incoherent, 
even entropic relationship between any type of synergy and concentration. In other words, 
concentration, whether it has changed or remained intact, plays insignificant role in post-M&A 
value creation, which is supported by Soledad, Peria and Mody (2004). Taking into consideration 
the above findings, Hypothesis 1 is accepted. 
                                                 
14)
 Also known as the Banking Act of 1933. 
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     Evidence of insignificant level of correlation is also associated with another aspect of 
quantitative outcome. It derives from dilemmatic behavior of M&A managers in strategizing 
concentration at a micro-level: Excessive maximization of customer deposit base is inevitably 
counterbalanced by concatenating regulatory requirements in the framework of mandating 
performance and prudential ratios, on the one side, and maintenance of competition in the banking 
industry, on the other side. 
place Table 4 about here 
     Hypothesis 2. Despite wide-spread dispersion of individual volatilities of accounting variables, 
their mean indicator signifies post-M&A consistency, although all ratios of the sample banks, 
except of OWNER_ROA, have higher volatility compared to the peer banks. Mean volatility of three 
remaining variables shows insignificant difference (13.2%) between their means. Higher volatility 
is associated with consolidations between strategically different institutions that require good deal 
of time for post-M&A alignment; another factor is attributable to broader dispersion of performance 
indicators of the sample banks compared to peers. Besides, although mean volatility of the sample 
banks exceeds volatility of USPRI during both observational periods, it is nevertheless less than 
volatility of variables of the peer banking group. Empirical results at this stage denote positive 
relationship between post-M&A economies of scope and growing capabilities during economic 
instability.  
     Further, test for statistical inference reveals that p-value of OWNER_CFEA and OWNER_ER are 
not statistically significant, especially in the indicative recession sub-period. P-value of the 
remaining variables is statistically significant. In general in this testing, p-value points lopsidedness 
of statistical significance among variables. Obviously, in terms of profitability and prudential ratios, 
sample banks demonstrate vulnerability to systematic risk. However, they effectively cope with it 
by asset redeployment and cost optimization. These merits overweigh statistical significance of 
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other variables: Mean p-value is 0.1141, which is comfortably higher the conventionally accepted 
threshold of 0.05. Following the above examination, Hypothesis 2 is accepted.  
     Hypothesis 3. Although it is generally accepted that post-M&A efficiency depends on improved 
market capitalization of the resulting institution, the latter’s stock market performance necessitates 
further examination as to whether it is a sole critical factor of post-M&A consistency and whether 
operating synergy should also receive equally important status in contributing to post-M&A 
smoothness.  
place Table 5 about here 
     Significant increase of POSTREV against PREREV and negligible rise of POSTCAP compared 
to PRECAP is consistent with Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) who observed the increase 
in profits after consolidation. However, it conflicts with Pilloff’s (1996) conclusion on no 
improvement of profitability followed by consolidation. Further insight into post-M&A indicators 
shows higher volatility of POSTCAP compared to POSTREV, although pre-M&A mean volatility 
displays the opposite scenario. Based on these results, Hypothesis 3 should be refuted; however, to 
streamline this model, Hypothesis 3 is further tested on sensitivity of POSTCAP to systematic risk. 
This idea originates from Leonard and Biswas (1998) who posit that balanced risk policy 
encourages direct investment, which increases profitability and capitalization during market 
equilibrium. However, almost one-third of the research horizon falls on recession sub-period that 
obviously had a deteriorating effect on market capitalization of corporations. Therefore, mean 
volatility of POSTCAP should be adjusted pro rata to the changed stock market volatility. Out of 14 
M&A, six deals (42.9%)
15)
 were consummated during the recession sub-period. Adjusted volatility 
                                                 
15)
 Bank of America/MBNA, Bank of America/LaSalle Bank, Citibank/Citibank West, Wells Fargo/Pacific 
Northwest Bank, PNC Bank/Farmers & Mechanics Bank, and U.S. Bank/Weststar Bank. 
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(VPOSTCAP(A)) is found from contributing macroeconomic volatilities in pre-recession (equilibrium) 
and recession periods using the following formula: 
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where 
VPOSTCAP is mean volatility of POSTCAP (Table 5); 
V(2000-07)  is contributing volatility at macroeconomic level equal to 2.81% (S&P, 2010) computed 
for the period of market equilibrium (2000 – Q2-2007); 
V(2007-10) is contributing volatility at macroeconomic level equal to 5.76% (S&P, 2010) computed 
for the recession sub-period (Q3-2007 – Q1-2010). 
 
Using the above formula, VPOSTCAP (A) = 4.0%. Compared to PRECAP volatility, adjusted POSTCAP 
volatility decreased by 0.88 basic points.  
     Another evidence of lower stock market performance volatility can be drawn from synergy–
concentration analysis (see Hypothesis 1). Volatility of FINSYNER/CAPCON is lower to 
OPERSYNER/CAPCON by around 6 basic points (Table 3). This should favor financial synergy as 
a more decisive measuring instrument of the post-M&A realm; however, operating synergy should 
not be understated: Its endogenous factors complementarily underlie holistic risk management 
approach thus enhancing depth and expanding coverage of post-M&A control for successful 
integration. 
place Table 6 about here 
     The results display almost equal relevance of both operating and financial synergies in 
measuring post-M&A risks. However, individual p-value indicators vary within both populations of 
variables causing some sort of research confusion. For higher research objectivity and to minimize 
observational error, the results are reassessed by means of aggregated means, following which p-
value of market capitalization variables demonstrates that it is not statistically significant, and under 
these circumstances, Hypothesis 3 is accepted. 
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     For testing Hypothesis 4, it was selected 7 conglomerate M&A deals consummated by the sample 
banks (resulted in their transformation to financial holding companies, FHC) in the analyzed period. 
The confined research base is however outweighed by variables of different performance 
characteristics of the sample group so that the results would have the highest possible research 
objectivity (Table 7). 
place Table 7 about here 
     Volatility of NONROA of the sample banks is lower compared to that of the peer banks, which 
signals that the sample banks possess higher operating sustainability in withstanding systematic 
risk. This conforms to Bösecke (2009) who found direct correlation between conglomerate M&A 
and the decrease of systematic risk that is a prerequisite of generating stable post-M&A revenue 
streams. However, her findings ramify with Templeton and Severiens’ (1992) and Demsetz and 
Strahan’s (1997) disbelief in conglomerates’ operating elasticity. These polar conclusions may stem 
from time difference in research meaning that in the contemporary business environment, 
conglomerates have developed sophisticated and reliable mechanisms of post-M&A integration 
including future profits. In this circumstance, Bösecke’s (2009) opinion implicitly specifies that at 
least operating synergy should be treated as a measuring instrument of post-M&A integration 
followed by cross-industry consolidations. Mean of individual volatilities of NONCAP is higher 
than of USCAP; however, volatility of their aggregated mean shows the opposite correlation. This 
once again testifies higher aptitude of FHC to macroeconomic challenges, mostly due to their 
ability of risk transfer by redistribution of resources and liquidity among their business units as well 
as higher flexibility in product management (types, prices, markets, etc). At the same time, 
volatility of NONPRI is significantly higher than USPRI. Nevertheless, it is assumed that dynamics 
of NONPRI stands secondary to NONCAP, since the latter incorporates consolidated market 
capitalization of the resulting FHC while NONPRI relates solely to the acquiring bank because the 
 26 
target companies are not listed at the stock exchanges. Furthermore, higher volatility of NONPRI is 
attributable to economies of scope of the sample banks, since their extensive coverage of national 
and global markets increases their sensitivity to crisis developments, which during the most recent 
recession were characterized by omnipresence throughout the world. 
place Table 8 about here 
     Analysis of Student‟s t-test shows that recession had a diminishing effect on post-M&A value 
creation: Despite relatively encouraging results from descriptive statistics, statistical test illustrates 
serious weaknesses in generating both types of synergy thus signifying FHC’s exposure to adverse 
macroeconomic trends, although advantages of unrelated M&A discussed earlier might have had 
certain mitigating effect. Based on the outcome of statistical inference, Hypothesis 4 is rejected and 
alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The research results elucidate principally new aspects of measuring risks in post-M&A integration. 
It was found that neither type of tangible synergy depends or affects concentration, even if the latter 
is strategized to maximize post-M&A operating and financial benefits. It is maintained that 
excessive emphasis on concentration may entail a reverse effect in both the short-run period (for 
example, shrinkage of deposit base due to unexpected attrition of customers dissatisfied with those 
aspects of integration that lacked improvement as an inevitable result of concentration-minded 
policy; inflexibility in ‘de-risking’ sensitive performance areas such as loan products, and so on) 
and long-run perspective (threat of monopolization and adverse impact on market competition 
followed by non-compliance with regulatory requirements and deal abandonment). 
     It was revealed that post-M&A majority ownership coupled with geographic diversification of 
the resulting BHC protects U.S. credit institutions from environmental risks through risk transfer 
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and redistribution of assets. However, absolute control may seriously affect post-M&A performance 
owing to the fact that the sole major shareholder becomes entirely responsible for M&A deal 
conduct and strategy implementation while its inaccurate decision-making may put the M&A 
process at significant risk.  
     It was determined that financial synergy is a more reliable measure of post-M&A sustainable 
development. Nevertheless, statistically tiny difference of mean p-value between financial and 
operating synergies signals that criticality of the latter for post-M&A alignment should not be 
extenuated. Although aggregated true mean of p-value favors financial synergy as a decisive 
component in measuring risks of post-M&A integration, empirical findings show unique role of 
each of synergetic domains – operating synergy as a reflection of indigenous (accounting-related) 
factors is evidence of promising effect of the expected profitability and positive cash flow while 
financial synergy as a reflection of the alignment of various performance characteristics signifies 
investors’ confidence as well as growth perspectives of the resulting institution.  
     Findings also show that FHC, compared to BHC and other types of traditional credit institutions, 
possess higher potential in coping with systematic risk due to stable revenue streams and adequate 
stock market performance ensued from cross-industry diversification and risk transfer. However, 
their well-balanced post-M&A strategy is weakened by overlooking or misconceptualizing a series 
of both evident and tacit risk factors at a macro-level, which means that their M&A conduct lacks 
holistic management. At the same time, there is no evidence the extent to which FHC might sustain 
crisis should it had been limited by their ‘host’ industries alone (that is, industries, which legal 
entities of FHC were initially originated from). As such, it would be premature to draw any 
inference from fallacy of their business models, as was suggested by experts doubting in financial 
liberalization and adequate performance of the U.S. banking conglomerates. 
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     Generalization of the above findings puts on the agenda the issue of manageability of risks 
underlying M&A processes. A number of cogent factors demonstrate that systematic risk is 
sustained by combination of factors in the framework of horizontal M&A only, which means that 
conglomerates are inherently vulnerable to systematic risk putting post-M&A value creation at 
significant risk. Nevertheless, a number of M&A risk management areas are remaining 
underconceptualized and as such, are inadvertently left in the post-M&A alignment. In fact, M&A 
processes are intertwined by multiple factors that are distinguished by their extent on whether, how, 
and when they create value. The research results show that the above factors are mostly identifiable 
and manageable at a firm-specific level while their realization depends on managerial ability to 
diagnose risks at a macro-level as well. As a result, different and oftentimes contradictory M&A 
criteria and stimuli exacerbated by drawbacks in risk management proliferate risks of poor 
alignment during consolidation. Moreover, traditional M&A instrumentation has become an 
impediment in managing systematic risk by conglomerates. 
     The above merits urge to quintessentialize M&A processes and underlying factors by recalibrating 
evaluation criteria from instant quantitative benefits into risk-minded philosophy wherein M&A 
objectives are strategized through risk measuring and risk management prism. First attempts to 
conceptualize new M&A paradigm in the framework of financial regulatory reform are demonstrated 
by DFA. However, despite its focus on higher consistency of the U.S. financial sector, some of its 
provisions may inhibit M&A movement and as such, freeze synergy-driven factors followed by series 
of unrealized growth potential to the detriment of organizational health and competitive capabilities of 
the U.S. banks and non-bank financial institutions. In fact, the roadmap of DFA implementation 
requires further insight into systematic risk factors as well as mechanism of their early determination 
and ‘parametrization’ to avoid risk of risk oversight. In other words, risk managerism should become a 
focal point of M&A paradigm shift and should be synchronized with regulation thus ensuring cross-
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elasticity between these risk domains. In this regard, the concerned U.S. authorities should refocus 
regulatory regime from rigorous to rational, adjustable to changing macroeconomic parameters, where 
prudential norms are grouped and classified according to the degree of explicit or tacit risk effect and 
are flexible to the changing risk factors. Additional quantitative and qualitative metrics underlying risk 
management should be developed to formalize risk probabilistic effect on post-M&A integrity. The 
higher the macroeconomic volatility the more expanded, detailed, and relevant should be the specified 
risk factors population. This sort of an „M&A risk matrix‟ should become a platform in navigating 
corporations in ‘M&A-making’ in longer-term perspectives while maintaining their confidence in 
post-M&A value creation as well as M&A positivism at large. Besides, it will sanitize M&A 
governance from subjectivity and assessment biases. 
     Risk-oriented regulatory reality would not only facilitate ‘microeconomic–macroeconomic’ fit but 
also set an impetus for rethinking M&A with non-financial companies
16)
. Otherwise, the existing 
regulatory restrictions coupled with upsurge of globalization and expansion-minded economic 
regulations in the other countries may result in outperformance of U.S. credit institutions by their 
overseas rivals followed by serious weaknesses in their competitive advantage and growth 
perspectives. 
 
6. Scope for Further Research 
6.1. Further Research as an Enabler in Overcoming M&A Gaps. 
Further insight into M&A’s behavioral aspects could be comprehended by comparative analysis of 
synergy of the resulting banks of specified assets/equity categories and further stratified by those 
with prior experience in the target market and those without that. This research would be a launch 
pad for rethinking strategies onto interstate M&A in that how to secure acquirer’s smooth post-
                                                 
16)
 M&A between financial and non-financial sectors are prohibited by Glass-Steagall Act. 
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M&A integration regardless its past exposure to the local markets but considering its size. 
Additionally, delving into interrelatedness between acquirer’s size, its local market expertise, and 
adequacy of synergetic effect would enable to elucidate post-M&A factors that are the most critical 
in value creation in the mid- and long-term perspectives as well as in ensuring sustainability to 
systematic risk. 
     Investigation into ‘synergy–diversification’ relationship should be expanded over at least three 
earlier decades to understand the variety of M&A driving forces as well as sources of synergy 
during non-diversified activities under the ban on interstate consolidations. Based on new findings, 
more risk-related factors at micro- and macro-levels could be revealed and integrated into „M&A 
risk matrix‟ and risk management mechanism. 
     Another research aspect in the field is M&A continuum. Commonly, M&A decision-making is 
refrained by fears of macroeconomic uncertainty and poor liquidity. At the same time, decline of 
corporations’ market value motivates high performers and growers to realize value creation through 
M&A-making. Such an antagonistic dilemma suggests that M&A yet will remain one of the 
primary tools of inorganic growth; however, to mitigate possible discouraging effect stemming 
from macro-level, further investigation into M&A processes should be focused on finding 
homogenous and heterogeneous risk factors, which would best fit during post-M&A integration. 
     In the course of M&A continuum is DFA’s innovation in regulation of FHC. Thus, it treats 
company as predominantly financial (that is, subject to industry regulation), if its revenues from the 
main activity or from financial assets constitute not less than 85% of total revenues (DFA, Sec.102, 
p.17). It implies that the remaining FHC would be ill-supervised and become more vulnerable to 
systematic risk. To understand whether the above threshold would ensure stability of the U.S. 
financial sector, an optimal solution could be drawn from situational analysis on how other than 
85% cut-off thresholds would impact FHC performance during macroeconomic instability. 
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     Future research should more emphasize unrelated M&A and conglomerates’ performance. Still, 
many scholars doubt in benefits of cross-industry M&A (see, for example, Thompson, 1984) or 
believe in their mediocre post-M&A performance as well as incongruity of earnings streams that 
may themselves alone exacerbate systematic risk (Gahlon and Stover, 1979). Testing results of 
Hypothesis 4 are in conflict with revolutionary mission of GLBA in financial liberalization. On the 
other side, weaknesses of FHC are aggravated not only by shortage of their experience but also by 
value destroying effect of recent recession. The question of FHC’s sustainability during 
hypothetical isolated banking crisis is still open and the relevant research could dissolve ambiguity 
of these findings through situational modeling and statistical simulation. 
6.2. Further Research as a Promoter of Paradigm Shift. 
In the recent decade, M&A patterns have reflected inflating mass of new and varying stimuli and 
impediments. It has become more difficult to maximize the number of post-M&A value-driven 
components. In addition, rapidly changing macroeconomic environment is perhaps the main 
perilous and unmanageable factor discouraging M&A continuum. As such, the latter cannot be 
further maintained unless the traditional quantitative and qualitative factors of M&A conduct are 
complemented by, and linked to, risk evaluation criteria and approaches. „M&A risk matrix‟ is an 
inevitable milestone in paradigmatic transformation from value-minded principles, which prioritize 
mostly immediate benefits to risk-minded business philosophy, which would highlight ‘de-
riskization’ of post-M&A integration for a longer perspective. Indeed, hidden risks may destroy 
post-M&A value irrespective of its actual increment.  
     The mounting challenges of new world economic order are radicalizing M&A aspects with 
principally new exogenous factors. Unawareness or misconception of their criticality significantly 
increases potential risk of post-M&A misalignment and failure. Expansion of M&A beyond the 
banking industry and rising number of complex M&A transactions would logically call on 
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systematization of industry regulation by bringing together regulatory functions that nowadays are 
dispersed among U.S. authorities (Bernanke, 2010). These circumstances demand principally new 
regulatory landscape that would match the challenges of paradigm shift. Specifically, institution of 
a separate official regulatory body – Federal Corporation on Mergers and Acquisitions (FCMA) – 
would benchmark a new era in regulation featured by risk managerism. Like prudential regulation 
secures safety of banks and the banking industry, M&A regulation will secure transitional safety, 
successful deal consummation, and industry and market positivism. Status of FCMA as a 
powerhouse of paradigm shift requires serious conceptualization as well as clear understanding of 
its functions as an overall promoter of competitive advantage of the U.S. banking industry. 
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Table 1 
Variables Definitions for Hypotheses 1 through 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Variables 
Hypothesis 1  OPERSYNER – operating synergy (Return on Assets (ROA), or profitability) 
FINSYNER – financial synergy (market capitalization) 
CAPCON – capital market concentration (HHI) 
Hypothesis 2  USPRI – S&P500 Stock Market Index 
OWNER_ROA – ROA (before taxation) 
OWNER_CFEA – cost of funding earning assets 
OWNER_ER – efficiency ratio 
OWNER_CLR – capital (leverage) ratio 
Hypothesis 3  PREREV – pre-M&A revenue 
POSTREV – post-M&A revenue 
PRECAP – pre-M&A market capitalization 
POSTCAP – post-M&A market capitalization 
Hypothesis 4  NONROA – ROA following M&A with non-bank financial companies 
NONCAP – market capitalization following M&A with non-bank financial companies 
NONPRI – stock price dynamics following M&A with non-bank financial companies 
USROA_L – profitability of the large U.S. banks 
USROA_F – profitability of U.S. banks with foreign offices 
USROA – profitability of all scheduled U.S. commercial banks 
USCAP – market capitalization average of peer U.S. banks following M&A 
USPRI – S&P500 Stock Market Index 
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Table 2 
 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficients for Synergy and Concentration Variables 
(Hypothesis 1) 
 
Acquiring/Acquired bank Obs. ρi(Xi1H;Yi1) ρi(Xi1P;Yi1) ρi(Xi1H;Yi2) ρi(Xi1P;Yi2) ρi(Xi2H;Yi1) ρi(Xi2P;Yi1) ρi(Xi2H;Yi2) ρi(Xi2P;Yi2) 
Bank of America/MBNA 
Bank of America / 
LaSalle 
Citibank / American 
Bank SSB 
Citibank / Citibank West 
J.P. MorganChase / Bank 
One 
Wells Fargo / State Bank 
of Rogers 
Wells Fargo / Pacific 
Northwest Bank 
PNC Bank / United Trust 
Bank 
PNC Bank / Farmers & 
Mechanics Bank 
U.S. Bank / U.S. Bank 
NA MT 
U.S. Bank / Weststar 
Bank 
SunTrust Bank / 
Lighthouse Community 
Bank 
SunTrust Bank / National 
Bank of Commerce 
Fifth Third Bank / 
Capital Bank 
TOTAL: 
Absolute mean: 
62 
 
148 
 
64 
62 
 
60 
 
176 
 
180 
 
170 
 
154 
 
58 
 
172 
 
 
62 
 
180 
 
152 
1,700 
 
NA 
 
--0.5218 
 
NA 
NA 
 
NA 
 
--0.1285 
 
0.3954 
 
--0.1323 
 
--0.2312 
 
NA 
 
--0.0362 
 
 
NA 
 
--0.2792 
 
--0.8256 
 
|0.3188| 
0.3242 
 
0.2667 
 
--0.0549 
--0.4066 
 
0.3846 
 
0.5105 
 
--0.2198 
 
0.2587 
 
--0.0091 
 
0.5165 
 
0.8881 
 
 
--0.1319 
 
0.1484 
 
--0.8132 
 
|0.3524| 
NA 
 
--0.4165 
 
NA 
NA 
 
NA 
 
--0.3562 
 
0.5238 
 
--0.0723 
 
--0.3261 
 
NA 
 
--0.1085 
 
 
NA 
 
--0.3608 
 
--0.8579 
 
|0.3778| 
0.3242 
 
--0.1333 
 
0.3077 
--0.5879 
 
0.0824 
 
--0.4406 
 
0.4780 
 
0.2727 
 
--0.1636 
 
0.2418 
 
0.7133 
 
 
--0.4286 
 
0.1374 
 
--0.8736 
 
|0.3704| 
NA 
 
--0.4844 
 
NA 
NA 
 
NA 
 
--0.2700 
 
0.6365 
 
0.9008 
 
0.4427 
 
NA 
 
0.1554 
 
 
NA 
 
0.5746 
 
0.6120 
 
|0.5096| 
0.5275 
 
0.3697 
 
0.2088 
--0.6923 
 
--0.5879 
 
0.5455 
 
--0.2198 
 
0.9930 
 
--0.0091 
 
--0.2637 
 
0.5245 
 
 
0.5769 
 
0.1648 
 
--0.1044 
 
|0.4134| 
NA 
 
-0.5286 
 
NA 
NA 
 
NA 
 
--0.5362 
 
0.8715 
 
0.8785 
 
0.4387 
 
NA 
 
0.0854 
 
 
NA 
 
0.5192 
 
0.6105 
 
|0.5586| 
0.6264 
 
0.7091 
 
0.6099 
--0.8407 
 
--0.8076 
 
--0.2378 
 
0.3846 
 
0.8322 
 
--0.1182 
 
--0.5549 
 
0.4336 
 
 
0.7967 
 
--0.4066 
 
--0.3187 
 
|0.5484| 
Notes: 
1. Due to occurrence of some M&A events in early/late 2000s and unavailability of earlier/later statistical data, the 
research period for those instances is limited to less than 6 years as against 3+3 research horizon approach. 
2. NA (not applicable) means that the acquiring bank was not present in the target market prior to the M&A event. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Correlation Coefficients (Hypothesis 1) and Volatility (Hypothesis 3) 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Summary of Volatility and Student’s t-test (Hypothesis 2) 
 
 Obs. Period Mi(S) Mi(B) STDi(S) STDi(B) Vi(S) Vi(B) STDi(B;S)
 17)
 ti p-value Notes 
OWNER_ROA 
82 H 1.76 0.97 0.1129 0.0904 6.41 9.32 0.0920 23.5119 <0.0001 S 
22 R 0.76 0.13 0.2127 0.1458 27.99 112.15 0.1506 11.4338 <0.0001 S 
OWNER_CFEA 
73 H 2.11 2.54 0.1663 0.1732 7.88 6.82 0.1728 6.8038 <0.0001 S 
22 R 1.86 1.98 0.2823 0.2946 15.18 14.88 0.2939 1.1163 0.2665 NS 
OWNER_ER 
73 H 55.68 56.0 0.6553 0.4701 1.18 0.84 0.4828 1.8120 0.0725 NS 
22 R 56.52 56.2 1.7289 1.5407 3.06 2.74 1.5522 0.5638 0.5739 NS 
OWNER_CLR 
82 H 7.45 9.09 0.0546 0.0628 0.73 0.69 0.0620 72.2467 <0.0001 S 
22 R 7.65 9.30 0.1401 0.0415 1.83 0.45 0.0523 86.3874 <0.0001 S 
USPRI 
41 H 1182.13 30.4810 2.58  
22 R 1157.72 66.7031 5.76 
);( RHV  
            H  4.05 4.42 
            R  12.02 32.56 
Mean  0.1141 NS 
Note: S – statistically significant; NS – not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17)
 Is first multiplier of denominator in formula (4). 
Variables Vari-
ances 
ρi(N;I) = {[--1; --0.75]; 
[0.75; 1]} 
ρi(N;I) = [--0.75; 0.75] Mi STDi Vi V  
i % to 
variances 
i % to variances 
ρi(Xi1H;Yi1) 
ρi(Xi1P;Yi1) 
ρi(Xi1H;Yi2) 
ρi(Xi1P;Yi2) 
 
8 
 
14 
 
8 
 
14 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
12.5 
 
14.3 
 
12.5 
 
7.1 
 
7 
 
12 
 
7 
 
13 
 
87.5 
 
85.7 
 
87.5 
 
92.9 
 
0.3188 
 
0.3524 
 
0.3776 
 
0.3704 
 
0.0852 
 
0.0672 
 
0.0813 
 
0.0600 
 
26.73 
 
19.07 
 
21.53 
 
16.20 
 
 
 
 
 
20.88 
TOTAL: 44 5 11.4 39 88.6     
ρi(Xi2H;Yi1) 
ρi(Xi2P;Yi1) 
ρi(Xi2H;Yi2) 
ρi(Xi2P;Yi2) 
 
8 
 
14 
 
8 
 
14 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
4 
 
12.5 
 
7.1 
 
25.0 
 
28.6 
 
7 
 
13 
 
6 
 
10 
 
87.5 
 
92.9 
 
75.0 
 
71.4 
 
0.5096 
 
0.4134 
 
0.5586 
 
0.5484 
 
0.0762 
 
0.0692 
 
0.0833 
 
0.0668 
 
14.95 
 
16.74 
 
14.91 
 
12.18 
 
 
 
 
14.70 
TOTAL: 44 8 18.2 36 81.8     
 Table 5 
Summary of Volatilities of Pre- and Post-M&A Variables (Hypothesis 3) 
Acquiring / Acquired bank 
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
M
i(
P
R
E
R
E
V
) 
S
T
D
i(
P
R
E
R
E
V
) 
V
i(
P
R
E
R
E
V
) 
M
i(
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O
S
T
R
E
V
) 
S
T
D
i(
P
O
S
T
R
E
V
) 
V
i(
P
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S
T
R
E
V
) 
M
i(
P
R
E
C
A
P
) 
S
T
D
i(
P
R
E
C
A
P
) 
V
i(
P
R
E
C
A
P
) 
M
i(
P
O
S
T
C
A
P
) 
S
T
D
i(
P
O
S
T
C
A
P
) 
V
i(
P
O
S
T
C
A
P
) 
Bank of America / MBNA 48 14,766 1253.75 8.49 18,863 1262.28 6.69 152,289 9446.87 6.20 189,141 9874.42 5.22 
Bank of America / LaSalle 44 18,286 700.28 3.83 27,932 3179.40 11.38 207,343 6903.50 3.33 126,750 13467.85 10.63 
Citibank / American Bank 
SSB 48 23,384 1105.13 4.73 21,613 1839.33 8.51 219,239 9766.83 4.45 226,258 13024.05 5.76 
                               
Citibank / Citibank West 48 24,387 1199.32 4.92 20,217 1837.70 9.09 242,753 2751.67 1.13 137,534 26248.35 19.08 
J.P. MorganChase / Bank 
One 48 9,092 541.72 5.96 15,732 569.98 3.62 76,976 8939.14 11.61 146,210 4947.05 3.38 
Wells Fargo / State Bank 
of Rogers 48 7,276 205.05 2.82 10,573 436.43 4.13 83,599 2188.49 2.62 107,527 2304.57 2.14 
Wells Fargo / Pacific 
Northwest Bank 48 9,116 340.45 3.73 13,329 989.22 7.42 98,904 1980.45 2.00 106,442 5399.60 5.07 
PNC Bank / United Trust 
Bank 48 1,487 52.09 3.50 1,723 161.40 9.37 15,134 738.46 4.88 17,568 739.80 4.21 
PNC Bank / Farmers & 
Mechanics Bank 46 1,761 158.35 8.99 3,113 404.39 12.99 18,832 884.35 4.70 21,680 1386.16 6.39 
U.S. Bank / U.S. Bank NA 
MT 46 2,718 323.81 11.91 3,774 46.77 1.24 29,720 3105.97 10.45 47,421 2143.73 4.52 
U.S. Bank / Weststar Bank 48 3,988 114.97 2.88 4,944 54.52 1.10 53,683 853.78 1.59 51,914 3277.33 6.31 
SunTrust Bank / 
Lighthouse Community 
Bank 48 2,025 47.76 2.36 1,972 73.61 3.73 17,490 560.10 3.20 22,418 1143.41 5.10 
SunTrust Bank / National 
Bank of Commerce 48 1,866 45.81 2.45 2,175 112.68 5.18 19,415 1046.44 5.39 26,463 906.17 3.42 
Fifth Third Bank / Capital 
Bank 38 1,030 89.09 8.65 1,562 41.33 2.65 21,216 1424.11 6.71 33,715 1110.39 3.29 
Mean 
Increase (+), decrease (--) 
 8,656 441.26 5.37 10,537 
+21.73% 
786.36 6.22 
+0.85bp 
89,757 3613.58 4.88 90,074 
+0.35% 
6140.92 6.04 
+1.16bp 
Table 6 
Summary of Student’s t-test (Hypothesis 3) 
Sample bank ti(PREREV;POSTREV) p-value Notes ti(PRECAP;POSTCAP) p-value Notes 
Bank of America 4.0055 0.0570 NS 2.1705 0.1622 NS 
Citibank 1.9365 0.1924 NS 3.3692 0.0779 NS 
J.P.Morgan Chase 11.9418 0.0069 S 9.5835 0.0107 S 
Wells Fargo 6.9578 0.0200 S 5.0800 0.0366 S 
PNC Bank 3.7202 0.0653 NS 2.7929 0.1079 NS 
U.S. Bank 6.3187 0.0241 S 3.3562 0.0785 NS 
SunTrust Bank 1.7365 0.2246 NS 6.5036 0.0228 S 
Fifth Third Bank 7.6613 0.0166 S 9.7884 0.0103 S 
Mean
18) 
NA 0.0759 NS NA 0.0634 NS 
True mean
19) 
7.8047 <0.0001 S 0.1664 0.8702 NS 
Note: S – statistically significant; NS – not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Volatility of Conglomerate M&A and Macroeconomic Variables (Hypothesis 4) 
 
Acquiring bank / Acquired 
non-bank company 
O
b
se
rv
a-
ti
o
n
s 
V
i(
N
O
N
R
O
A
) 
V
i(
U
S
R
O
A
_
L
) 
V
i(
U
S
R
O
A
_
F
) 
V
i(
U
S
R
O
A
) 
V
i(
N
O
N
C
A
P
) 
V
i(
U
S
C
A
P
) 
V
i(
N
O
N
P
R
I)
 
V
i(
U
S
P
R
I)
 
Bank of America / U.S. 
Trust Corporation 81 6.79 91.13 96.60 150.90 11.14 9.29 16.17 5.18 
PNC Bank / Hilliard 
Lyons Trust Co. 86 3.24 0.89 1.14 2.24 3.45 3.37 3.27 3.33 
PNC Bank / Riggs 
National Trust Co. 104 8.08 10.25 9.88 9.37 3.34 3.32 2.58 2.17 
PNC Bank / Mercantile-
safe Deposit & Trust Co. 79 20.36 82.13 81.63 105.62 7.05 8.72 7.48 5.56 
U.S. Bank / Mercantile 
Trust Co. 68 2.30 4.18 4.80 3.85 6.50 2.28 2.15 4.60 
SunTrust Bank / STI 
Capital Management 46 3.31 5.00 5.86 4.63 4.49 3.34 2.78 5.22 
SunTrust Bank / SunTrust 
Bankcard 104 5.17 10.25 9.88 9.37 5.18 3.33 5.05 2.17 
iV  
 
7.04 29.12 29.97 40.85 5.88 4.81 5.64 4.03 
iSTD  
 
2.1801 13.8270 14.2582 21.4094 0.9498 1.0142 1.7494 0.5114 
V   30.97 47.48 47.57 52.41 16.15 21.09 31.02 12.69 
 
                                                 
18)
 Is an arithmetic mean of p-value of PREREV/POSTREV and PRECAP/POSTCAP stem from 
p-values of each sample bank. 
19)
 Is an aggregated mean which is calculated from arithmetic means of PREREV, POSTREV, 
PRECAP, and POSTCAP and their standard deviations as per Table 5. 
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Table 8 
Summary of Student’s t-test (Hypothesis 4) 
Sample 
bank 
ti(NONROA;
USROA_L) 
p-value Notes ti(NONCAP;
USCAP) 
p-value Notes ti(NONPRI; 
USPRI) 
p-value Notes 
Bank of 
America 
2.3038 0.0230 S 12.2776 <0.0001 S 26.7806 <0.0001 S 
PNC Bank 2.3295 0.0216 S 28.5815 <0.0001 S 37.3532 <0.0001 S 
U.S. Bank 16.1880 <0.0001 S 58.0120 <0.0001 S 30.1184 <0.0001 S 
SunTrust 
Bank 
0.8170 0.4156 NS 40.7437 <0.0001 S 37.8074 <0.0001 S 
Mean NA 0.1151 NS NA <0.0001 S NA <0.0001 S 
Notes: 
1. For M&A with two and more occurrences, variables and their standard deviations are averaged to their 
means. 
2. S – statistically significant; NS – not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
